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RESPONSE
CAN WE ACT GLOBALLY WHILE
THINKING LOCALLY?
RESPONDING TO STELLA BURCH ELIAS,
THE PERILS AND POSSIBILITIES OF
REFUGEE FEDERALISM
KITJOHNSON*
In The Perils and Possibilities of Refugee Federalism, Professor Stella
Burch Elias skillfully exposes both the dangers and the opportunities presented
by state responses to the resettlement of refugees within their borders. She
concludes that states are prohibited from excluding refugees from their territory,
but she argues that states have a previously untapped opportunity to legislate at
the local level in an effort to promote the integration of refugees into their
communities.
This Response does not challenge those conclusions. Rather, this Response
seeks to provide context to the idea of refugee federalism by further discussing the
problem, acknowledged by Professor Elias, that, legal or not, states are
successfully avoiding the placement of refugees within their borders.
Additionally, this Response attempts to articulate a concern that increasing state
involvement regarding the selection of refugees may exacerbate the nimbyism that
already pervades the treatment of refugees in the United States.
* Associate Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law; J.D., University of
California, Berkeley School ofLaw. I am thankful for the thoughtful feedback and insights
of Eric E.Johnson. © 2017 KitJohnson.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, state lawmakers have sought to expand their role
regarding the resettlement of refugees within their borders.1 Most
have sought to limit or eliminate refugee placement in their
communities, though some states have actively promoted their
welcomeness to refugees.2 In The Perils and Possibilities of Refugee
Federalism, Professor Stella Burch Elias aptly christens this wave of state
lawmaking "refugee federalism."'
Professor Elias's Article is both timely and important. Donald
Trump thrust the issue of refugee resettlement in the United States to
the forefront of national debate during his 2016 presidential
campaign.4 That rhetoric resonated in states that sought to craft local
legislation regarding refugees.' In her Article, Professor Elias not only
1. See Stella Burch Elias, The Perils and Possibilities of Refugee Federalism, 66 AM. U. L.
REv. 353, 391 (2016) (exploring the rise of "refugee federalism," where states use
gubernatorial decrees, legislation, and litigation, to either limit or support the
settlement of refugees and asylees within their territory).
2. Id. This Response uses the phrase "refugees and asylees" interchangeably with
"refugees." Refugees and asylees are both defined by the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) § 101 (a) (42). 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (2012). They differ largely in terms
of the location from which they seek U.S. aid-overseas (refugees) or at/within our
borders (asylees).
3. Elias, supra note 1, at 358 (defining refugee federalism as "the engagement of
state governmental actors in lawmaking pertaining to refugees and asylees").
4. See, e.g., Kit Johnson, Local Coverage of Trump's Minnesota Pitch,
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Nov. 8, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
immigration/2016/11/local-coverage-of-trumps-minnesota-pitch.html (discussing a
newscaster's smiles, laughter, and cheers in the course of covering a rally where
candidate Trump promised the crowd that "[a] Trump administration will not admit
any refugees without the support of the local community where they are being
placed").
5. See, e.g., Kit Johnson, North Dakota Legislators Introduce Anti-Refugee Bill,
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG, (Jan. 20, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
immigration/2017/01/north-dakota-proposes-anti-refugee-bill.html (discussing a
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identifies and describes this surge of state lawmaking, she
comprehensively defines the legal boundaries that ought to cabin such
efforts.6 That is, she offers well-needed guidance to states regarding
what they can and cannot do in the name of refugee resettlement.
7
Professor Elias thereby makes a significant contribution to the field,
one that builds substantially on her prior work exploring more broadly
"new immigration federalism."'
Anti-refugee state statutes, Professor Elias explains, likely run afoul
of federal constitutional law, and that, in turn, renders them ineffective. 9
While Professor Elias's legal analysis is persuasive on this point, it is
important to acknowledge that, despite legal hurdles, states have been
successful in forestalling the placement of refugees. And that success is a
significant downside to refugee federalism as it is evolving in practice.
Professor Elias explains that, in contrast to anti-refugee legislating
by states, state efforts to welcome and integrate resettled refugees are
legally permissible. 10 She emphasizes that states have great flexibility
when it comes to taking the initiative to offer an array of refugee services.
Professor Elias's pathmarking work in this vein helps pave the way for
innovative local lawmaking. But caution is called for. The idea that
states should be allowed to lobby for the resettlement of refugees where
they could have a "positive economic and social impact" at the state level
is another potentially troubling aspect of refugee federalism, because states
proposed North Dakota bill that would track the state's "absorptive capacity" for
refugees and allow local governments to petition for, and the governor to execute, a
moratorium on refugee resettlement); NationwideAnti-Refugee Legislation by State, ACLU
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-
security/discriminatory-profiling/nationwide-anti-refugee-legislation-state (providing
a map of states that attempted to prevent lawfully admitted refugees from settling in
their territories).
6. See Elias, supra note 1, at 403-05 (noting that states and the federal government
may pass alienage laws, but "it is hard to see how state executive orders or legislation
designed to ban refugees and asylees from state territory would survive even the most
cursory constitutional challenge").
7. Id. at 407-08 (discussing the framework for inclusionary state lawmaking
related to refugees).
8. See Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 704-
05 (2013) (defining the "new immigration federalism" as interactive
multigovernmental rulemaking pertaining to immigrants and immigration at the state
level, including rulemaking intended to foster immigrant inclusion).
9. Elias, supra note 1, at 405.
10. See id. at 409 (stating that these efforts are "where the true ... possibilities of
refugee federalism lie").
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could exercise such power in a way that would advance local interests to
the detriment of national goals, and perhaps should be expected to do so.
While this Response expresses concerns about the vision of refugee
federalism, it bears pointing out that Professor Elias's Article has
already gained a real-world track record of helping to minimize
refugee federalism's perils. In January 2017, the North Dakota state
legislature introduced a bill to determine the state's "refugee
absorptive capacity" and to authorize a moratorium on refugee
resettlement in the state upon a showing that cities could not absorb
additional refugees.11 Activists opposing the bill used Professor Elias's
Article to craft written testimony to argue both that refugees do not
pose a security threat because they are carefully vetted before they ever
enter the United States and that the state bill impermissibly conflicted
with federal law. 12 Ultimately, the bill was revised to become an
unfunded "legislative management study of refugee resettlement in
North Dakota"l-a clear victory for the activists. 4
This Response recognizes and celebrates the distinct value of
Professor Elias's Article. It offers modest critiques that center on the
success of state anti-refugee measures and the concerning
ramifications of increased state involvement in the selection of
refugees. Part I discusses state anti-refugee measures, addressing both
the law at issue and the questions raised by state successes that fly in
the face of legal prohibitions. Part II examines the great potential for
misconduct that arises if states are allowed a say as to which refugees
should join their communities.
I. THE PROBLEM OF EFFECTIVE STATE ANTI-REFUGEE MEASURES
States do not have unfettered discretion to legislate in the area of
immigration."5 That is because the "[p]ower to regulate immigration
11. Johnson, supra note 5; see H.B. 1427, 65th Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2017).
12. See E-mail from Murray Sagsveen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Dirs., Lutheran Soc. Servs.
of N.D., to author and Stella Burch Elias (Feb. 3, 2017, 21:15 MST) (on file with
author) (providing an update on the legislative hearing for the North Dakota bill and
noting the reliance on Professor Elias's Article by the bill's opponents).
13. See N.D. H.B. 1427; S.JOURNAL, 65th Leg. Sess. 1018-19 (N.D. 2017) (reporting
the passage of the bill).
14. See E-mail from Anna Marie E. Stenson, Immigration Att'y, Minn.-N.D. Chapter
of the Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n (Feb. 6, 2017, 10:08 MST) (on file with author)
(hypothesizing that "the raw emotion of the refugees and former refugees who
testified carried the day").
15. See Kit Johnson & Peter J. Spiro, Debate, Immigration Preemption After United
States v. Arizona, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 105 (2012) (debating the limits of
220 [Vol. 67:217
2017] CAN WE ACT GLOBABLY WHILE THINKING LOCALLY? 221
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."16  State laws that
interfere with the federal government's power over immigration are
therefore preempted. That does not, however, mean such state laws
are "completely ineffectual.
17
In this Part, I begin by addressing the federal power over
immigration and the preemption of state laws in conflict with that
power. I then tackle the issue of how states successfully interfere in this
realm, despite the legal obstacles in place.
A. Preemption of Exclusionay Lawmaking
The federal government alone has the authority to determine who
should be admitted into and removed from the United States.1
Individual states have no analogous power.1
Despite this lack of authority, some states have engaged in what
Professor Elias dubs "exclusionary lawmaking."20 Through executive
orders, gubernatorial decrees, legislation, and litigation, states have
worked to keep asylees and refugees from settling within their
borders.21 In a nutshell, such efforts are legally unavailing22 because
federal law is the "supreme Law of the Land."2 When states attempt
to usurp the federal government's exclusive authority over
immigration law and policy, those efforts are federally preempted.24
As Professor Elias notes, one of the principal justifications
underlying preemption in the immigration context focuses on foreign
state and local lawmaking regarding undocumented migrants in the wake of the
Supreme Court holding in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)).
16. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1976).
17. Elias, supra note 1, at 402.
18. See INA § 240(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2012) ("Unless otherwise
specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and
exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United
States or ... removed from the United States."); see also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
354-55 (1976) ("a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain," is the type of
regulation of immigration that is "unquestionably exclusively a federal power").
19. Johnson & Spiro, supra note 15, at 102 (citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408)
(explaining that states may not set their own immigration policies).
20. Elias, supra note 1, at 403.
21. Id. at 401 (citing Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902,
905 (7th Cir. 2016)).
22. Id. at 401-02 (citing Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc., 838 F.3d at 904-05).
23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
24. Johnson & Spiro, supra note 15, at 104; Elias, supra note 1, at 401.
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affairs.2' The Supreme Court has explained that because "a country's
treatment of non-citizens within its borders can gravely affect foreign
relations, 2 6 the federal government must be able to speak "with one
voice" in dealing with other nations.27 If a foreign government
perceives-rightly or wrongly-that a host government has wronged its
citizens, the consequences can be grave, "sometimes even leading to
war."2 Therefore, local interference is not legally tolerated.
These are exactly the issues at stake with states' exclusionary
lawmaking. States cannot be allowed to deride nations by declaring
their citizens unwelcome and characterizing such individuals as
potential security threats. 29  Declarations of this sort threaten our
relations around the globe.
The case of Farmers Branch, Texas is illustrative."0 A suburb of
Dallas, Farmers Branch passed three housing ordinances in three
years, each with the goal of preventing undocumented immigrants
from living in rental housing within city limits."1 With unabashed
25. See Elias, supra note 1, at 404.
26. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 525 (5th
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-68 (1941)).
27. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 409; see id. at 395 ("It is fundamental that foreign countries
concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States
must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign,
not the 50 separate States.").
28. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 64.
29. See Elias, supra note 1, at 380 (quoting Texas Governor Greg Abbott's direction
to the state's resettlement program "not to participate in the resettlement of any Syrian
refugees in the State of Texas" on the grounds that they lack guarantees that "Syrian
refugees will not be a part of terroristic activity"); see also Jamie Lovegrove, South
Carolina Gov. Heny McMaster Wants to Halt Refugee Resettlements from Countries in Trump
Travel Ban, POST & COURIER (Aug. 30. 2017), http://www.postandcourier.com/
politics /south-carolina-gov-henry-mcmaster-wants-to-halt-refugee-resettlements/
article_4384b72a-8d03-11e7-bfef-3b4944cfd976.html (reporting on a speech by South
Carolina Governor Henry McMaster in which he discussed the threat of "terrorists in
the world" and said, "We want no refugees from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria[,]
or Yemen, just like President Trump said, until those procedures can be made safe,
sound[,] and secure.").
30. SeeJohnson & Spiro, supra note 15, at 101 (discussing housing ordinances that
the city of Farmers Branch passed to exclude undocumented immigrants).
31. Id. at 100-01. Farmers Branch is by no means the only city to have enacted
anti-immigrant housing ordinances. Hazleton, Pennsylvania enacted the first such
ordinance in 2006. See HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 (2006) (stating that the
purpose of the ordinance is "to be free of the debilitating effects" of illegal
immigrants). Fremont, Nebraska, adopted a similar ordinance in 2010. See FREMONT,
NEB., ORDINANCE No. 5165 (2010).
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nimbyism, one member of the Farmers Branch city council publicly
stated that the ordinances "sent a message to people who aren't in the
country legally, Farmers Branch is not the place for you," 2 and further
admitted that the ordinances were aimed at "reduc [ing] the illegal
immigrant population in Farmer's Branch."" This language is very
similar to that of states engaged in exclusionary lawmaking designed
to "halt the placement of any new refugees"3 4 and "suspend the
resettlement of additional... refugees. ' "
Landlord and tenant groups challenged Farmers Branch, and courts
repeatedly and consistently found the city's ordinances preempted by
federal law.36 The federal district court that initially heard the case
found the city's ordinances-which hindered noncitizens from renting
property in the city-to impermissibly restrict the admission and
residence of noncitizens and, therefore, found the ordinances
preempted by federal law.3 7 The initial Fifth Circuit panel agreed,
noting that Farmers Branch's efforts to exclude undocumented
immigrants from its community ran afoul of the federal government's
prerogative of deciding who has the right to the live in the United
States. 8 Ultimately, the case was reheard en banc, and while the Fifth
Circuit once again found the local law preempted by federal law, this
time it did so without focusing on admission and resettlement. 9
Instead, the court focused on criminal provisions of the ordinance that
conflicted with federal law. 0
The Farmers Branch litigation provides an interesting case study for
exclusionary laws and federal preemption. Factually, the laws seeking to
bar the settlement of undocumented aliens within Farmers Branch directly
parallel the exclusionary laws highlighted by Professor Elias. Andjust
32. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d 802, 805 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2012), aff'd on reh 'g, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
33. Id. at 806. Other officials echoed this language. Id. (noting that the Farmers
Branch city attorney stated that the goal of the ordinances was to "reduce the number
of illegal immigrants in Farmers Branch").
34. Elias, supra note 1, at 355 (quoting Arizona Governor Doug Ducey).
35. Id. at 360 (quoting then Indiana Governor Mike Pence).
36. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835,
841 (N.D. Tex. 2010), affd, 675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012), affd on reh'g, 726 F.3d 524
(5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see alsoJohnson & Spiro, supra note 15.
37. Villas at Parkside Partners, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855.
38. Villas at ParksidePartners, 675 F.3d at 810-11.
39. Villas at Parkside Partners, 726 F.3d at 526.
40. Id.
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as the Farmers Branch ordinances were found to be preempted by federal
law, so too have state efforts to exclude refugees been found preempted.41
B. Success ofExclusionafy Lawmaking
While states do not have the legal authority to pass laws regarding
whether refugees and asylees should be allowed to settle in their
territory, states' efforts in this area have not been fruitless. Despite the
legal hurdles, states have achieved a great deal on the exclusion front.
Take Wyoming. As Professor Elias highlights, Wyoming does not
have a refugee resettlement program.42 It is, in fact, the only state
without one.43  As a result, zero refugees are directly resettled in
Wyoming.44 The refugees who find their way to Wyoming do so
because ofjobs, school, or family.4" The lack of a refugee resettlement
program in Wyoming is not due to oversight or neglect. It is by design.
Wyoming has no established resettlement program because, according
to one state lawmaker, 'just a small change in the demographics here
could upset the Wyoming economy [and] the Wyoming culture ....
We have to take care of Wyoming's own first."46 By staying aloof, the
41. See Elias, supra note 1, at 400-01 (citing Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v.
Pence, 165 F. Supp. 3d 718 (S.D. Ind. 2016)) (noting that the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana found Indiana's state ban on refugee resettlement
and funding for community organizations serving refugees preempted because "the
state was both intruding upon a field of law occupied by the federal government and
preventing the federal government from achieving one of its legitimate goals-the safe
and effective placement of refugees").
42. Elias, supra note 1, at 375.
43. See The Modern West 21: Wyoming's Immigrants and Refugees, WYo. PUB. MEDIA,
(Mar. 23, 2017), http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/modern-west-21-wyomings-
immigrants-and-refugees [hereinafter The Modern West 21] (noting that despite a large
immigrant population, Wyoming is the only state without a refugee resettlement
program).
44. See Ben Neary, Gov. Matt Mead Calls on President to Halt Refugee Program, CASPER
STAR TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2015), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/gov-matt-mead-
calls-on-president-to-halt-refugee-program/article_4e856e5b-fd7d-5452-984d-
64773c99d542.html (stating that attempts to start a refugee program in Wyoming have
been met with public criticism); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REFUGEE ARRIVALS BY STATE
FROM OCTOBER 1, 2016 THROUGH MAY 31, 2017 1 (2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/580e4274e58c624696efadc6/t/5936ce6946c3
c496baa4ccbf/1496764011135/Arrivals+by+State+-+Map% 286.5.17% 29.pdf (reporting
that no refugees were resettled in Wyoming from October 1, 2016 to May 31, 2017).
45. See The Modern West 21, supra note 43 (discussing the ways in which immigrants
and refugees typically enter Wyoming).
46. Id. (interview with State Senator Scott Clem).
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Equality State4 7 has managed to successfully avoid what should be a
national obligation to care for displaced persons. And it has done so
without drafting a single piece of exclusionary legislation that might
be subject to preemption analysis.
Other states have had success in different ways. As Professor Elias
notes, the federal government's decision to house Central American
asylum seekers in remote facilities in Artesia, New Mexico, and Karnes
City, Texas, was made in direct response to protests in Arizona, New
Mexico, Michigan, and Virginia where residential centers were initially
planned."8 Oklahoma was also successful in having the state's sole
shelter for unaccompanied minors shut down.49  Particularly
emblematic of how legality often fails to translate to reality, the State
of Indiana successfully kept one Syrian family from resettling in the
state, even though its plan to suspend resettlement entirely was
ultimately enjoined in court.
Consider the human context of these states' exclusionary efforts.
Refugees and asylees are individuals who, by definition, have been or
would be persecuted in their home country because of politics, religion,
nationality, race, or group membership5l To put it more plainly, they
have been chased from their homes and have nowhere else to go.5
2
47. The "Equality State" is a recognized nickname of the State of Wyoming. See,
e.g., In re Neely, 390 P.3d 728, 764 (Wyo. 2017) (referring to Wyoming as the "Equality
State"); Haagensen v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Compen. Div., 949 P.2d 865, 871
(Wyo. 1997) (same); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Wyo. 1986) (same). In
addition, "Equal Rights" is the official state motto. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-3-107 (2017).
48. Elias, supra note 1, at 384-85. Note that this sort of victory was not limited to
states. The small inland city of Murrieta, California, managed to turn away three buses
of asylum seekers and have them re-routed to another state facility on the Mexican
border. SeeJames Nye, "Return to Sender! "Hundreds of Furious Californian Protestors Block
Road to Buses Canying 140 Illegal Immigrant Women and Children Forcing Them to Turn
Back to Border Post, DAiLY MAIL (July 1, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2677429/Return-sender-Hundreds-furious-protestors-block-road-buses-
carrying-140-women-children-illegal-immigrants-force-border.html.
49. See Kit Johnson, A Victoiy for Oklahoma Governor Over Immigrant "Daycare,"
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Aug. 8, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
immigration/2014/08/a-victory-for-oklahoma-governor-over-immigrant-daycare.html
(noting that the Governor of Oklahoma started a petition to garner support for
shutting down the facility).
50. Elias, supra note 1, at 400.
51. INA § 101 (a) (42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (2012).
52. See id. (defining a refugee as an individual "who is unable or unwilling to return
to" his or her home country); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(c) (2), 208.15 (2017) (detailing that
an individual cannot be considered a refugee if they have "firmly resettled" in a third
country by receiving "an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other
225
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Consider also the global context of states' exclusionary efforts.
Refugees and asylees admitted to the United States represent a minute
portion of the global refugee population, which at present numbers
nearly 22.5 million people.5' Annually, the United States takes in far
less than 100,000 refugees-that is, less than 0.005% of those in need. s4
Other countries take in far more. 3 Meanwhile, the United States is
the world's wealthiest nation, accounting for around twenty-five
percent of global GDP, 6 and is the world's third largest in geographic
type of permanent resettlement"); see also Warsan Shire, Home, GENIUS,
https://genius.com/Warsan-shire-home-annotated (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) ("no
one leaves home until home is a sweaty voice in your ear / saying- / leave, / run away from
me now / i dont know what i've become / but i know that anywhere/ is safer than here").
53. See Figures at a Glance, UNHCR (June 19, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/figures-at-a-glance.html.
54. See NADWA MOSSAD, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT:
REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2015 1 (Nov. 2016),
https: //www.dhs.gov /sites /default/ files /publications /RefugeesAsylees-2015.pdf
(reporting that a total of 69,920 refugees were admitted to the United States in 2015).
In September of 2016, President Obama set the target number of refugee admissions
for fiscal year (FY) 2017 at 110,000. SeeJuliet Eilperin, White House Raises Refugee Target
to 110,000, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/14/white-house-
plans-to-accept-at-least-li0000-refugees-in-2017. When President Trump took office
inJanuary 2017, he reduced the FY 2017 target to 50,000. See Exec. Order No. 13,769,
§ 5(d), 82 Fed. Reg. 8979 (Fed. 1, 2017) (stating that admitting refugees in excess of
50,000 would be "detrimental to the interests of the United States"). That cap was met
in July, and the total number of refugee admissions for FY 2017 will exceed that 50,000
goal. See Abigail Hauslohner, U.S. Surpasses Trump Administration's Cap on Refugee
Admissions, WASH. POST (July 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/us-surpasses-cap-on-refugee-admissions/2017/07/12/dbb8e98e-672a-1 1e7-
ald7-9a32c91c6f40_story.html. President Trump has authorized a refugee admission
cap for FY 2018 of 45,000. Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for
FiscalYear 2018, 82 Fed. Reg. 49,083 (Sept. 29, 2017). This new figure came after the
Department of Homeland Security recommended a cap of 40,000. SeeJulie Hirschfeld
Davis & Miriam Jordan, White House Weighs Lowering Refugee Quota to Below 50, 00, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/politics/trump-
refugee-quota.html (reporting that Stephen Miller, President Trump's senior advisor
for policy has advocated lowering the target number to 15,000, which is less than
fifteen percent of President Obama's FY 2017 goal).
55. See, e.g., Ten Countries Host Half of World's Refugees: Report, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 4, 2016),
http: //www.aljazeera.com /news/ 2016 /10 /ten-countries-host-world-refugees-report-
161004042014076.html (listing the following ten countries: Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan,
Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad).
56. See Gross Domestic Product 2016, WORLD BANK 1 (Apr. 17, 2017),
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (listing the United States
GDP for 2016 as $18.5691 trillion).
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area.57  Given this bounty, and considering the United States'
economic, social, and political interconnectedness with the world s8 one
could easily say that the United States' limited acceptance of refugees
amounts to a shirking of our global burden-sharing obligations. 9
This means that state anti-refugee efforts add a new layer of shirking
to an already ungenerous American policy towards individuals who
have fled their homes only because it was unsafe to remain.60 As
explained above, states do not legally have a leg to stand on when it
comes to interfering with the national effort to resettle refugees.61
When they interfere nonetheless, the result is ignoble.
Squarely confronting the effectiveness of states' shirking forces us to
question the role that states should play in dealing with refugees and
asylees. And it should cause us to consider whether the system itself
should be reformed in a way that the federal government might
demand proportional and consistent treatment of refugees across states.
II. THE PROBLEM OF STATE SELECTION OF REFUGEES
States' actions with regard to refugees and asylees are not all
exclusionary. Many states are exploring the possibilities of what
Professor Elias terms "inclusionary lawmaking."62 While such a trend
is positive in numerous ways, there are nonetheless reasons why those
sympathetic to the cause of displaced persons might be chary of the
inclusionary side of refugee federalism. In this Part, I discuss why.
57. See The World Factbook: County Comparison: Area, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (ranking nations of
the world by geographic area).
58. Kit Johnson, Theories of Immigration Law, 46 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1211, 1237 (2014)
(defining the interconnectedness theory of global welfare as the belief that "the gains
and losses of each member of the global community would countjust as much as those
of U.S. citizens").
59. Id. at 1239.
60. I find the words of Twitter contributor @erpruc on point: "[A]sk not what your
community can do for you; ask what your community can not do for anyone else." @erpruc,
TWITTER, (Aug. 3, 2012), https://twitter.com/erpurc/status/231430038694789120. Her
sarcastic quip came out of a 2012 Twitter conversation on the topic of
#inspirationalNIMBY, involving mash-ups of well-known inspirational quotes with
NIMBY flair. See David Alpert, Inspirational Quotes Turn NIMBY, GREATER GREATER
WAsH. (Aug. 4, 2012), https://ggwash.org/view/28550/inspirational-quotes-turn-nimby.
61. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing how federal
immigration law preempts state attempts to regulate immigrants and refugees).
62. Elias, supra note 1, at 403, 407-09.
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Professor Elias shows state inclusionary measures to be
"underexplored opportunities" that are not only lawful but often
laudable." As examples of inclusionary lawmaking that fall within the
zone of clearly acceptable state action, she highlights state programs
offering financial assistance, educational support, health care, and
legal help to refugees and asylees.64 These are measures that may not
only support refugees and asylees as they are resettled in a state, but
also might induce secondary migration-the movement of refugees
and asylees into a state after their initial resettlement elsewhere. In
either case, programs that expand the availability of social services are
well within the states' lawful spending powers.6"
More saliently, Professor Elias perceives a special role for the
application of state expertise in a way that can inure to the benefit of
both refugees and states. She suggests that "states may be able to
identify in advance locations where refugees and asylees in general-
and specific communities of refugees and asylees, in particular-would
be especially welcome and useful."66 She sees an untapped opportunity
for states to express "preferences about refugees' suitability or
characteristics for resettlement. 6 7 States might, she argues, be in a
good position to identify and advocate for "newcomers who are
particularly desirable for a given state."68
While the upside identified by Professor Elias is clear, there are
grounds for caution. Inclusionary means may have exclusionary
outcomes. Giving states an effective means of choosing which refugees
and asylees they will take inevitably implicates a power to choose which
refugees and asylees they will exclude.69 A state that actively seeks to
63. Id. at 403.
64. Id.at410-11.
65. As Professor Spiro notes, states also have discretion under federal law to deny
such benefits to noncitizens. Johnson & Spiro, supra note 15, at 107.
66. Elias, supra note 1, at 409.
67. Id. at 408.
68. Id. at 410.
69. This is a power that states would very much like to have. See, e.g., Letter from
Scott Walker, Governor of Wis., to DonaldJ. Trump, President-Elect of the U.S. (Dec.
20, 2016), https://walker.wi.gov/sites/default/files/Letter to President-
electDonaldJTrump.pdf (congratulating Mr. Trump on his election and suggesting
principles of cooperation between Wisconsin and the federal government, including
the following request: "We would like our state to have a broader role in determining
how many refugees and from which countries .. "); see also Lovegrove, supra note 29
(quoting South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster: "We want no refugees from Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria[,] or Yemen ... ").
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fill up its fair share of resettlement obligations with one category of
refugees does so to the exclusion of what it might deem to be less
desirable refugee groups.
This is not to say that it is impossible to view state preferences in a
positive or pragmatic light. States might be more readily equipped to
deal with Spanish-speaking students in the classroom as opposed to
students who are Arabic-speaking because they already have Spanish-
speaking staff in public schools. 70 Similarly, states might have a greater
need for workers with experience in agricultural work due to labor
shortages in that sector, rather than workers with experience in factory
work due to job scarcity in that field, and that distinction might break
down by country of origin.
71
Regardless of such considerations, however, giving states a voice in
the allocation of refugees is fraught with challenges. There will always
be refugees who speak a language that is uncommon in the United
States, and there will always be refugees who lack skills necessary for
the U.S.job market. This is because, in contradistinction to other areas
of immigration law, the United States does not accept refugees because
of what they can offer to the country. Rather, the United States accepts
refugees because it is the right thing to do, because the refugees are in
need, because the contiguous nations that offered temporary aid are
overwhelmed by the demand, and because we aspire to be a country
that carries its share of global burdens.
Allowing states to pick and choose among admitted refugees opens
the door to local decision-making based on race, religion, education,
gender, and sexual orientation, among other criteria. That is to say, it
invites exclusionary rather than inclusionary lawmaking. And states
are prone to seize opportunities to engage in discriminatory conduct
because they have a strong tendency to pass laws that benefit or simply
70. NANCY RHODES & INGRID PUFAHL, OBSERVATORIO REPORTS, AN OVERVIEW OF
SPANISH TEACHING IN U.S. SCHOOLS: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS 8 (2017),
http://cervantesobservatorio.fas.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/002_informes nr s
pteaching.pdf (noting that over three 10-year survey periods, "Spanish was taught in
all [regions of the United States] by more than 90% of schools with foreign-language
programs" whereas languages such as Arabic, Russian, and Hebrew were taught in "less
than 3% [of schools] at all three points in time").
71. Cf Natalie Kitroeff& Geoffrey Mohan, Wages Rise on California Farms. Americans
Still Don't Want the Job, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
projects /la-fi-farms-immigration (finding that vineyards in California are suffering
from a shortage of workers caused by fewer Mexicans willing to immigrate to America
after a tightening of the security on the southern border).
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appeal to their voting constituents. 72  Yet the issue of refugee
resettlement is a national one involving a nonvoting population whose
protection should be a matter of national concern.
73
The different forms of inclusionary lawmaking identified by
Professor Elias are amenable to distinction. On the one hand,
lawmaking pertaining to the integration and upkeep of refugees and
asylees-including their education and health care-seems both
normatively desirable and legally permissible. On the other hand,
lawmaking pertaining to the selection of refugees for admission to
states raises questions about the role states should play in this area.
CONCLUSION
Professor Elias's Article brings needed illumination to the
phenomenon she has discerned as refugee federalism. She situates the
current spate of state legislation regarding refugees in the context of
international and federal law. She explains the role that states have
traditionally played in the refugee arena, and she identifies the ways in
which states have sought to expand their authority in this area-both
by excluding and including migrants. Ultimately, Professor Elias
concludes that although federal preemption presents a significant
stumbling block to state efforts that would restrict the resettlement of
refugees, 74 there is tremendous potential for states to engage in
inclusionary lawmaking designed to promote the integration and
acceptance of refugees. 75 It is a testament to the importance of her
piece that Professor Elias's Article has already contributed to the real-
world debate over the role of the states in this area.
76
This Response attempts to build on the insights of Professor Elias,
noting first that despite the constitutional hurdles to anti-refugee state
lawmaking, states have nonetheless been successful in thwarting the
72. SeeJohnson & Spiro, supra note 15, at 111 ("Overwhelmingly, state and local
lawmaking is politically lopsided against immigrants."); see also Sara Rathod, The Freak-
Out over Syrian Refugees Is Continuingin These States, MOTHERJONES (Feb. 26, 2016, 11:00
AM), http://www.mothejones.com/poEtics/2016/02/anti-Syrian-refugee-legislation-states
(reporting that more than half of America's governors announced anti-refugee
policies following the San Bernardino terrorist attack).
73. SeeJohnson & Spiro, supra note 15, at 111 (arguing that States tend to focus on
issues affecting their constituents, so a national solution is necessary).
74. Elias, supra note 1, at 412-13.
75. Id. at 413-14.
76. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing how Elias's Article was
cited in an argument against an anti-refugee North Dakota law).
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resettlement of refugees. Second, this Response questions whether, if
given the opportunity to be more involved in the choice of who to
resettle, states are likely to act in an undesirable, exclusionary way.
In many ways, resettlement of refugees is a federal issue, implicating
not only foreign relations, national security, and human rights, but also
the fundamental cultural question of how America sees itself in the
global community. 77 Yet resettlement is also a local issue, as every
refugee will eventually make a home in a specific locality. On the front
lines of relocation, states may have unique ideas about how to better
resettle refugees. The federal government, in turn, should do a better
job of listening to those ideas.
In seeing the great potential of state voices in the refugee context,
we should not be blind to the propensity of states to engage in
nimbyism-whether that takes the form of looking to avoid the
problem of refugees altogether or to minimize discomfiture by seeking
out "good" refugees. 78 State-interestedness is especially problematic in
this arena because it may build on top of the national-nimbyism
evident in our country's refugee program as a whole. The United
States accepts a shockingly small number of refugees each year,
particularly when viewed in comparison to its capacity to help. To
require those select few refugees who have been accepted into the
United States to run the gauntlet of yet another layer of nimbyism at
the state level is unacceptable.
Professor Elias's Article provides keen insight into the important
phenomenon of refugee federalism. This Response seeks to further
the conversation about its perils and possibilities.
77. Johnson & Spiro, supra note 15, at 112.
78. See generally Amos Roberts, We're Quick to Label Refugees as Either 'Good' or 'Bad,'
but They're All Entitled to Protection, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2017),
http: //www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree /2017 /jun/ 28 /were-quick-to-label-
refugees-as-either-good-or-bad-but-theyre-all-entitled-to-protection ("When it comes to
refugees, we seem to delight in extremes that reinforce our own view of the world-so-
called 'bad' refugees ... who outrage the community, or 'good' ones, who enrich it.").
